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1. Introduction
In the classical consumption and investment problem, a risk-averse in-
vestor wants to maximize her/his expected discounted utility of consumption
by selecting optimal consumption and investment strategies. Merton (1969)
was the first to obtain explicit solutions to this problem in continuous time.
Many generalizations to Merton’s work can be found in Karatzas (1996),
Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Sethi (1997), et ce´tera. In the traditional mod-
els for consumption and investment problems, there is only one source of risk
that comes from the uncertainty of the stock prices. But in real life, apart
from the risk exposure in the financial market, investors often face other ran-
dom risks, such as property-liability risk and credit default risk. Thus, it is
more realistic and practical to extend the traditional models by incorporating
an insurable risk. When an investor is subject to an additional insurable risk,
buying insurance is a trade-off decision. On one hand, insurance can provide
the investor with compensation and then offset capital losses if the specified
risk events occur. On the other hand, the cost of insurance diminishes the
investor’s ability to consume and therefore reduces the investor’s expected
utility of consumption.
The initial optimal insurance problem studies an individual who is sub-
ject to an insurable risk and seeks the optimal amount of insurance under
the utility maximization criterion. Using the expected value principle for
premium, Arrow (1963) found the optimal insurance is deductible insurance
in discrete time. Promislov and Young (2005) reviewed optimal insurance
problems (without investment and consumption). They proposed a general
market model and obtained explicit solutions to optimal insurance problems
under different premium principles, such as variance principle, equivalent
utility principle, Wang’s principle, et ce´tera.
Moore and Young (2006) combined Merton’s optimal consumption and
investment problem and Arrow’s optimal insurance problem in continuous
time. They found explicit or numerical solutions for different utility func-
tions (although they did not verify rigourously that the obtained strate-
gies were indeed optimal). Perera (2010) revisited Moore and Young’s work
by considering their problem in a more general Levy market, and applied
the martingale approach to obtain explicit optimal strategies for exponen-
tial utility functions. Pirvu and Zhang (2012) considered the insurable risk
to be mortality risk and studied optimal investment, consumption and life
insurance problems in a financial market in which the stock price followed a
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mean-reverting process.
In traditional financial modeling, the market parameters, like the risk-free
interest rate, stock returns and volatility, are assumed to be independent of
general macroeconomic conditions. However, historical data and empirical
research show that the market behavior is affected by long-term economic
factors, which may change dramatically as time evolves. Regime switch-
ing models use a continuous-time Markov chain with a finite-state space to
represent the uncertainty of those long-term economic factors.
Hamilton (1989) introduced a regime switching model for the first time
to capture the movements of the stock prices and showed that the regime
switching model represents the stock returns better than the model with
deterministic coefficients. Thereafter, regime switching has been applied to
model many financial and economic problems. In regard to optimal port-
folio selection problems, Zhou and Yin (2004) considered a financial market
with regime switching and studied the problem under the Markowitz’s mean-
variance criterion. Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) considered the problem
under the expected utility of consumption maximization criterion, and ob-
tained explicit solutions for HARA utility functions.
In the insurance market, insurance policies can depend on the regime of
the economy. In the case of traditional insurance, the underwriting cycle has
been well documented in the literature. Indeed, empirical research provides
evidence for the dependence of insurance policies’ underwriting performance
on external economic conditions (see for instance Grace and Hotchkiss (1995),
Haley (1993) on property-liability insurance, and Chung and Weiss (2004)
on reinsurance). In the case of non-traditional insurance, by investigating
the comovements of credit default swap (CDS) and the bond/stock markets,
Norden and Weber (2007) found that CDS spreads are negatively correlated
with the price movements of the underlying stocks and such cointegration is
affected by the corporate bond volume.
In this paper, we use an observable continuous-time finite-state Markov
chain to model the regime of the economy, and allow both the financial
market and the insurance market to depend on the regime. Our objective
is to obtain simultaneously optimal consumption, investment and insurance
policies for a risk-averse investor who wants to maximize her/his expected
total discounted utility of consumption over an infinite time horizon. We
extend Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) by including a random loss in the
model and an insurance policy in the control. The most important difference
between the model of Moore and Young (2006) and our paper is that they
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do not allow regime switching, while we allow regime switching in both the
financial market and the insurance market.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discribe the prob-
lem. The verification theorems are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we
obtain explicit solutions for four HARA utility functions. In Section 5, we
conduct an economic analysis to investigate the impact of various factors on
the optimal policy and calculate the advantage of buying insurance. Section
6 concludes our study.
2. The Model
Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) in which a standard
Brownian motion W and an observable continuous-time, stationary, finite-
state Markov chain  are defined. Denote by S = {1, 2, · · · , S} the state
space of this Markov chain, where S is the number of regimes in the econ-
omy. The matrix Q = (qij)S×S denotes the strongly irreducible generator of
, where ∀ i ∈ S, ∑j∈S qij = 0, qij > 0 when j 6= i and qii = −∑j 6=i qij.
We consider a financial market consisting of two assets, a bond with price
P0 (riskless asset) and a stock with price P1 (risky asset), respectively. Their
prices processes are driven by the following dynamics:
dP0(t) = r(t)P0(t)dt,
dP1(t) = P1(t)(µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)),
with initial conditions P0(0) = 1 and P1(0) > 0. The coefficients ri, µi and
σi, i ∈ S, are all positive constants.
An investor chooses pi = {pi(t), t ≥ 0}, the proportion of wealth invested
in the stock, and a consumption rate process c = {c(t), t ≥ 0}. We assume
the investor is subject to an insurable loss L(t, (t), X(t)), where X(t) denotes
the investor’s wealth at time t. We shall use the short notation Lt to replace
L(t, (t), X(t)) if there is no confusion. We use a Poisson process N with
intensity λ(t), where λi > 0 for every i ∈ S, to model the occurrence of this
insurable loss. In the insurance market, there are insurance policies available
to insure against the loss Lt. We further assume the investor can control
the payout amount I(t), where I(t) : [0,∞) × Ω 7→ [0,∞) and I(t, ω) :=
It(L(t, (t, ω), X(t, ω))), or in short, I(t) = It(Lt). For example, if ∆N(t0) =
1, then at time t0 the investor suffers a loss of amount Lt0 but receives a
compensation of amount It0(Lt0) from the insurance policy, so the investor’s
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net loss is Lt0 − It0(Lt0). Following the premium setting used in Moore and
Young (2006) (the famous expected value principle), we assume investors pay
premium continuously at the rate P given by
P (t) = λ(t)(1 + θ(t))E[It(Lt)],
where the positive constant θi, i ∈ S, is known as the loading factor in
the insurance industry. Such extra positive loading comes from insurance
companies’ administrative cost, tax, profit, et ce´tera.
Following Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009), we assume the Brownian
motion W , the Poisson process N and the Markov chain  are mutually
independent. We also assume that the loss process L is independent of N .
We take the P−augmented filtration {Ft}t≥0 generated by W , N , L and  as
our filtration and define F := σ(∪t≥0Ft).
For an investor with triplet strategies u(t) := (pi(t), c(t), I(t)), the associ-
ated wealth process X is given by
dX(t) =
(
r(t)X(t) + (µ(t) − r(t))pi(t)X(t)− c(t)− λ(t)(1 + θ(t))
· E[It(Lt)]
)
dt+ σ(t)pi(t)X(t)dW (t)− (Lt − It(Lt)) dN(t),
(1)
with initial conditions X(0) = x > 0 and (0) = i ∈ S.
We define the criterion function J as
J(x, i;u) := Ex,i
[∫ +∞
0
e−δtU(c(t), (t))dt
]
, (2)
where δ > 0 is the discount rate and Ex,i means conditional expectation given
X(0) = x and (0) = i. We assume that for every i ∈ S, the utility function
U(·, i) is C2(0,+∞), strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies the linear
growth condition
∃K > 0 such that U(y, i) ≤ K(1 + y), ∀ y > 0, i ∈ S.
Besides, we use the notation U(0, i) := lim
y→0+
U(y, i), ∀ i ∈ S.
We define the bankruptcy time as
Θ := inf{t ≥ 0 : X(t) ≤ 0}.
Since an investor can consume only when her/his wealth is strictly posi-
tive, we define
R(Θ) :=
∫ ∞
Θ
e−δtU(c(t), (t))dt =
∫ ∞
Θ
e−δtU(0, (t))dt.
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A control u := (pi, c, I) is called admissible if {ut}t≥0 is predictable with
respect to the filtration {Ft}t≥0 and satisfies, ∀ t ≥ 0
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c(s)ds
]
< +∞,
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
σ2(s)pi
2(s)ds
]
< +∞,
Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δsU+(c(s), (s))ds
]
< +∞,
and I(t) ∈ It := {I : 0 ≤ I(Y ) ≤ Y, where Y is Ft-measurable}.
We use Ax,i to denote the set of all admissible controls with initial con-
ditions X(0) = x and (0) = i. Then we formulate our optimization problem
as follows.
Problem 2.1 Select an admissible control u∗ = (pi∗, c∗, I∗) ∈ Ax,i that max-
imizes the criterion function J . In addition, find the value function
V (x, i) := sup
u∈Ax,i
J(x, i;u).
The control u∗ is called an optimal control or an optimal policy.
Moore and Young (2006) also incorporated an insurable risk into the
consumption and investment framework. However, they did not consider a
regime switching model, or equivalently they assumed that there is only one
regime in the economy. Nevertheless, the insurable risk and the coefficients
of the financial market most likely depend on the regime of the economy.
Hence, in the above regime switching model, we assume that the insurance
market (insurable loss and insurance performance) and the financial market
are regime dependent. Furthermore, we assume these two markets depend
on the same regime. We mention three examples below. First, the assump-
tion that the financial market and the insurance market depend on the same
regime is supported by the bailout case of AIG (see Sjostrom (2009) for
details) and the financial derivatives in the insurance industry. Before the
crash of the U.S. housing market in 2007, many investors, banks and finan-
cial institutions bought obligations constructed from mortgage payments or
made loans to the housing agencies. To insure against the credit risk that
the obligations or loans may default, they purchased credit default swap
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(CDS) contracts from insurance companies like AIG. In a CDS contract, the
buyer makes periodic payments to the seller, and in return, receives the par
value of the underlying obligation or loan in the event of a default. Appar-
ently, the credit default risk insured by CDS contracts is negatively correlated
with the reference entity’s stock performance (see Norden and Weber (2007)
for empirical evidence). Second, generated by the financial engineering on
derivatives, insurance companies have created numerous equity-linked prod-
ucts, such as equity-linked life insurance (see Hardy (2003) for more details
on such insurance policy). If the insured of an equity-linked life insurance
policy survivals to the expiration, then the beneficiary receives investment
benefit that depends upon the market value of the reference equity. Hence,
equity-linked life insurance and its reference equity are affected by the same
long-term economic factors. Third, even in traditional insurance products
like property-liability insurance, there is empirical evidence (see for instance
Grace and Hotchkiss (1995)) that the loading factor θ depends on the regime
of the economy. Indeed, in those traditional insurance products, λ(t) and
L(t, (t, ω), X(t, ω)) might be independent of (t) but θ(t) depends on (t).
3. Verification Theorems
Let ψ : (0,∞) × S → R be a function with ψ(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞),∀ i ∈ S.
We define the operator Lui by
Lui (ψ) := (rix+ (µi − ri)pix− c− λi(1 + θi)E[I(L)])ψ′ +
1
2
σ2i pi
2x2ψ′′ − δψ,
where ψ′ = ∂ψ
∂x
and ψ′′ = ∂
2ψ
∂x2
.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose U(0, i) is finite, ∀ i ∈ S. Let v(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞) be
an increasing and concave function such that v(0, i) = U(0,i)
δ
for every i ∈ S.
If v = v(·, ·) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
sup
u
{Lui v(x, i) + U(c, i) + λiE[v(x− L+ I(L), i)− v(x, i)]}
= −
∑
j∈S
qij
(
v(x, j)− U(0, j)
δ
)
(3)
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for every x > 0, i ∈ S, and the control u∗ = (pi∗, c∗, I∗) defined by
u∗t := arg sup
u
(
Lu(t)v(X∗t , t) + U(c, t)
+ λ(t)E[v(X
∗
t − Lt + I(Lt), t)− v(X∗t , t)]
)
10≤t<Θ
is admissible, then u∗ is optimal control to Problem 2.1. In addition, the
value function is given by
V (x, i) = v(x, i) +
1
δ
Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)
]
,
where dU(0, s) :=
∑
j∈S
qs,jU(0, j)ds.
Furthermore, if the utility function does not depend on the regime, namely
U(y, i) = U(y), for every i ∈ S, then the value function V (x, i) = v(x, i).
Proof. ∀u ∈ Ax,i, consider f(t,Xt, t) := e−δt(v(Xt, t) − U(0,t)δ ). By ap-
plying Ito’s formula for Markov-modulated processes (see, for instance, So-
tomayor and Cadenillas (2009)), we get
f(t,Xt, t) =
∫ t
0
e−δs
(
Lu(s)(s) v(Xs, s) + λ(s) [v(Xs − Ls + Is, s)− v(Xs, s)]
+
∑
j∈S
qs,j
(
v(Xs, j)− U(0, j)
δ
)
+ U(0, s)
)
ds
+ v(X0, 0)− U(0, 0)
δ
+mft , (4)
where {mft }t≥0 is a P−martingale with mf0 = 0.
Let 0 < a < X0 = x < b <∞ and define a stopping time τ := inf{t ≥ 0 :
Xt ≤ a or Xt ≥ b}. Then by replacing t by t ∧ τ in (4), taking conditional
expectation and applying the HJB equation (3), we obtain
Ex,i[f(t ∧ τ,Xt∧τ , t∧τ )] ≤ −Ex,i[
∫ t∧τ
0
e−δs(U(cs, s)− U(0, s))ds]
+ v(x, i)− U(0, i)
δ
.
Let a ↓ 0, b ↑ +∞ and t → ∞. Then t ∧ τ → Θ. Since f is continuous,
we obtain
f(t ∧ τ,Xt∧τ , t∧τ )→ f(Θ, 0, Θ) = 0, when a ↓ 0, b ↑ +∞, t→∞.
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Hence,
v(x, i)− U(0, i)
δ
− Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δs(U(cs, s)− U(0, s))ds
]
≥ 0. (5)
Define g(t, t) := −e−δt U(0,t)δ . Applying Ito’s formula to g(t, t) yields
g(t, t)− g(0, 0) =
∫ t
0
e−δs
(
U(0, s)− 1
δ
∑
j∈S
qs,jU(0, j)
)
ds+mgt ,
where {mgt}t≥0 is a square-integrable martingale with mg0 = 0.
Taking conditional expectation and applying the monotone convergence
theorem to the above equality, we get
U(0, i)
δ
= Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsU(0, s)ds
]
− 1
δ
Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)
]
,
and then
v(x, i)− U(0, i)
δ
− Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δs(U(cs, s)− U(0, s))ds
]
=v(x, i)− Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsU(0, s)ds− 1
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)
]
− Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δs(U(cs, s)− U(0, s))ds
]
=v(x, i) +
1
δ
Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)
]
− Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δsU(cs, s)dsds
]
− Ex,i
[∫ ∞
Θ
e−δsU(0, s))ds
]
.
Hence, the inequality (5) can be rearranged as
(x, i) +
1
δ
Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)
]
≥ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsU(cs, s)ds
]
= J(x, i;u),
and the equality will be achieved when u = u∗.
If the utility function does not depend on the regime, then dU(0, s) =
U(0) · ∑
j∈S
qijds = 0, and so V (x, i) = v(x, i). 
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U(·, i) is an increasing function for every i ∈ S, so if U(0, i) is not fi-
nite, then U(0, i) = −∞. The following theorem deals with the case when
U(0, i) = −∞, ∀ i ∈ S.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose U(0, i) = −∞ for every i ∈ S. Let v(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞)
be an increasing and concave function such that v(0, i) = −∞ for every i ∈ S.
If v = v(·, ·) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
sup
u
{Lui v(x, i) + U(c, i) + λiE[v(x− L+ I(L), i)− v(x, i)]}
= −
∑
j∈S
qijv(x, j) (6)
for every x > 0, i ∈ S, and the control u∗ = (pi∗, c∗, I∗) defined by
u∗t := arg sup
u
(
Lu(t)v(X∗t , t) + U(c, t)
+ λ(t)E[v(X
∗
t − Lt + I(Lt), t)− v(X∗t , t)]
)
10≤t<Θ
is admissible, then u∗ is an optimal control to Problem 2.1 and the value
function is V (x, i) = v(x, i).
Proof. Define h(t,Xt, t) := e
−δtv(Xt, t). For any admissible control u, by
following a similar argument as in Theorem 3.1, we obtain
Ex,i [h(t ∧ τ,Xt∧τ , t∧τ )] = Ex,i
[ ∫ t∧τ
0
e−δs
(
Lu(s)(s) v(Xs, s) +
∑
j∈S
qs,jv(Xs, j)
+ λiE[v(Xs − Ls + Is, s)− v(Xs, s)]
)
ds
]
+ v(x, i)
≤ v(x, i)− Ex,i
[∫ t∧τ
0
e−δsU(cs, s)ds
]
.
Ex,i
[∫ t∧τ
0
e−δsU(c(s), (s))ds
]
is well defined and finite, because u is an ad-
missible control and U satisfies the linear growth condition. Then the above
inequality becomes
v(x, i) ≥ Ex,i [h(t ∧ τ,Xt∧τ , t∧τ )] + Ex,i
[∫ t∧τ
0
e−δsU(cs, s)ds
]
.
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By assumption, v(·, i) is increasing in (0,∞) and v(0, i) = U(0,i)
δ
= −∞
for every i ∈ S, so
Ex,i[h(t ∧ τ,Xt∧τ , t∧τ )] ≥ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
t∧τ
e−δsU(0, s)ds
]
.
By letting a ↓ 0, b ↑ +∞ and t → ∞, and applying the monotone
convergence theorem, we obtain
v(x, i) ≥ Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δsU(cs, s)ds
]
+ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
Θ
e−δsU(0, s)ds
]
= J(x, i;u),
and the equality holds when u = u∗. 
4. Explicit Solutions of Value Function and Optimal Strategies
In this section, we obtain explicit solutions to optimal consumption, in-
vestment and insurance problem when there is regime switching in the econ-
omy. We assume the utility function is of HARA type and the insurable loss
L is proportional to the investor’s wealth, L(t, (t), X(t)) = η(t) ltXt. Here
for every i ∈ S, ηi > 0 measures the intensity of the insurable loss in regime
i, and for every t ≥ 0, lt denotes the loss proportion at time t. We assume
that lt is Ft−measurable and lt ∈ (0, 1) for all t ≥ 0.
To obtain optimal policy, we first construct a candidate policy at time
t, which is a function of (x, i, l), namely, pi∗ = pi∗(x, i, l), c∗ = c∗(x, i, l) and
I∗ = I∗(x, i, l) (In fact, we find pi∗ and c∗ are independent of l). The candidate
policy is indeed optimal once we can prove it is an admissible policy.
We rewrite the HJB equation (3) as
max
pi
[
(µi − ri)pixv′(x, i) + 1
2
σ2i pi
2x2v′′(x, i)
]
+ max
c
[
U(c, i)− cv′(x, i)
]
+ λi max
I
[
Ev(x− ηilx+ I(ηilx), i)− (1 + θi)E(I(ηilx))v′(x, i)
]
= (δ + λi)v(x, i)− rixv′(x, i)−
∑
j∈S
qij
(
v(x, j)− U(0, j)
δ
)
, (7)
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and the HJB equation (6) as
max
pi
[
(µi − ri)pixv′(x, i) + 1
2
σ2i pi
2x2v′′(x, i)
]
+ max
c
[
U(c, i)− cv′(x, i)
]
+ λi max
I
[
Ev(x− ηilx+ I(ηilx), i)− (1 + θi)E(I(ηilx))v′(x, i)
]
= (δ + λi)v(x, i)− rixv′(x, i)−
∑
j∈S
qijv(x, j). (8)
We conjecture that v(·, i) is strictly increasing and concave for every i ∈ S.
Then a candidate for pi∗ is given by
pi∗(x, i) = −(µi − ri)v
′(x, i)
σ2i xv
′′(x, i)
. (9)
Since U ′ is strictly decreasing, the inverse of U ′ exists. Then a candidate
for c∗ is given by
c∗(x, i) = (U ′)−1(v′(x, i), i). (10)
For the optimal insurance, we have the following Lemma and Theorem.
Lemma 4.1 ∀x > 0 and i ∈ S, denote z0 := ηil0x, where constant l0 ∈
(0, 1). We denote the optimal insurance policy by I∗. Then we have
(a) I∗(x, i, l0) = 0 if and only if
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′(x− z0, i).
(b) 0 < I∗(x, i, l0) < z0 if and only if
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x− z0 + I∗(x, i; l0), i).
Proof. ∀ i ∈ S, we use the notation z := ηilx. We then break the proof
into four steps.
Step 1: We want to show that I∗(x, i, l) 6= z, ∀ l ∈ (0, 1).
Assume to the contrary that ∃ l0 ∈ (0, 1) such that I∗(x, i, l0) = I∗(z0) =
z0. Consider I¯(x, i, l) := I
∗(x, i, l) − ζG(l), where ζ > 0 and G(l) = 1 when
l0 − ρ < l ≤ l0 + ρ and 0 otherwise, ρ > 0. Here we choose small ζ and ρ to
ensure that 0 ≤ I¯(z) ≤ z. Let
f I(x, i, l; I) := E [v(x− z + I(z), i)]− (1 + θi)E [I(z)] v′(x, i).
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Since I∗ is the maximizer of f I(x, i, l; I), we have
E
[
v(x− z + I¯(z), i)− v(x− z + I∗(z), i)] ≤ (1 + θi)E[I¯(z)− I∗(z)]v′(x, i).
Using Taylor expansion and letting ζ → 0+, we get
(1 + θi)E
[
G(l)]v′(x, i) ≤ E[v′(x− z + I∗(z), i)G(l)].
Letting ρ → 0+ (z → z0) and applying the mean value theorem of inte-
grals, we obtain
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≤ v′(x− z0 + I∗(z0), i) = v′(x, i),
which is a contradiction since v′(x, i) > 0 and θi > 0, ∀i ∈ S.
Step 2: We want to show that I∗(x, i, l0) = 0⇒ (1 + θi)v′(x, i) ≥ v′(x−
z0, i).
To this purpose, we consider I¯ ′(x, i, l) := I∗(x, i, l) + ζG(l). For small
enough ζ and ρ, we have 0 ≤ I¯ ′(z) ≤ z. Then a similar argument as above
gives the desired result
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′(x− z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i) = v′(x− z0, i).
Step 3: We want to show that 0 < I∗(x, i, l0) < z0 ⇒ (1 + θi)v′(x, i) =
v′(x− z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i).
In this step, we consider I¯(x, i, l) and I¯ ′(x, i, l). From the results in Step
1 and Step 2, we obtain (1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≤ v′(x − z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i) and
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′(x − z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i) at the same time, and thus the
equality is achieved.
Step 4: We want to show that (1+θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′(x−z0, i)⇒ I∗(x, i, l0) =
0.
We assume to the contrary that I∗(x, i, l0) > 0. Then the results above
give (1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x − z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i) < v′(x − z0, i), which is a
contradiction to the given condition. A similar method also applies to the
proof of (1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x− z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i)⇒ 0 < I∗(x, i, l0) < z0. 
Theorem 4.1 The optimal insurance is either no insurance or deductible
insurance (almost surely).
(a) The optimal insurance is no insurance I∗(x, i, l) = 0,∀i ∈ S, when
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′((1− ηi ess sup(l))x, i). (11)
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(b) The optimal insurance is deductible insurance I∗(x, i, l) = (ηilx − di)+,
∀ i ∈ S, when there exists di := di(x) ∈ (0, x) satisfying
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x− di, i). (12)
Proof. We complete the proof in three steps.
Step 1: We want to prove Case (a).
Assume there exists l0 ∈ (0, 1) such that 0 < I∗(x, i, l0) < z0. Then ac-
cording to (b) in Lemma 4.1, we have (1+θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x−z0+I∗(x, i, l0), i).
Define the set Nl := {ω ∈ Ω : l(ω) > ess sup(l)} (we have P{Nl} = 0). If
l0 ≤ ess sup(l) (on the set N cl ), then v′((1 − ηi ess sup(l))x, i) > v′(x − z0 +
I∗(x, i, l0), i) = (1+θi)v′(x, i), which is a contradiction to the given condition.
Therefore I∗(x, i, l) = 0 on the set N cl .
Besides, if two policies I1 and I2 only differ on a negligible set, we have
f I(i, l; I1) = f
I(i, l; I2), because the integration of a bounded function on a
negligible set is zero.
Step 2: We want to prove Case (b).
We notice that v′(·, i) is a strictly decreasing function, so if such di exists,
it must be unique. We then break our discussion into two disjoint scenarios.
(i) 0 < l0 ≤ di
ηix
In this scenario, ηil0x ≤ di, so we have
v′((1− ηil0)x, i) ≤ v′(x− di, i) = (1 + θi)v′(x, i).
Then by part (a) of Lemma 4.1, we obtain
I∗(x, i, l0) = 0 = (ηil0x− di)+.
(ii)
di
ηix
< l0 < 1
In this scenario, we have 0 < I∗(x, i, l0) < z0 since v′((1 − ηil0)x, i) >
v′(x− di, i) = (1 + θi)v′(x, i). Then the result in Lemma 4.1 shall give
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x− z0 + I∗(x, i, l0), i) = v′(x− di, i).
Due to the monotonicity of v′(·, i), we must have
I∗(x, i, l0) = ηil0x− di = (ηil0x− di)+.
Step 3: We want to show that either (11) or (12) holds.
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If condition (11) fails, then
v′(x, i) < (1 + θi)v′(x, i) < v′((1− ηi ess sup(l))x, i) ≤ v′(0, i),
where v′(0, i) := limx→0 v′(x, i). Since v′(·, i) is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in [0, x], there must exist a unique di ∈ (0, x) such that
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) = v′(x− di, i).
If (12) has no solution in (0, x), then
(1 + θi)v
′(x, i) ≥ v′(0, i) ≥ v′((1− ηi ess sup(l))x, i).
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal insurance is either no insurance
or deductible insurance. 
Remark 4.1 The optimal insurance I∗ also satisfies the usual properties:
I∗t (0) = 0 and I
∗
t (·) is an increasing function of the loss.
To find explicit solutions to the optimal consumption, investment and
insurance problem, we consider four utility functions of HARA class. The
first three utility functions do not depend on the market regimes:
1. U(y, i) = ln(y), y > 0,
2. U(y, i) = −yα, y > 0, α < 0,
3. U(y, i) = yα, y > 0, 0 < α < 1.
The fourth utility function depends on the regime of the economy and we
assume there are two regimes in the economy (S = 2).
4. U(y, i) = βiy
1/2, y > 0, βi > 0, i = 1, 2.
All these four utility functions are C2(0,∞), strictly increasing and con-
cave, and satisfy the linear growth condition. To be specific, we can take
K = 1 for the first three utility functions and K = max{β1, β2} for the last
one.
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4.1. U(y, i) = ln(y), y > 0,∀ i ∈ S
In this case, a solution to the HJB equation (8) is given by
vˆ(x, i) =
1
δ
ln(δx) + Aˆi, i ∈ S, (13)
where the constants Aˆi, i ∈ S, will be determined below.
Since vˆ′(x, i) = 1
δx
, vˆ′′(x, i) = − 1
δx2
and (U ′)−1(y, i) = 1
y
, we obtain from
(9) and (10) that
pi∗(x, i) =
µi − ri
σ2i
and c∗(x, i) = δx.
Solving (1 + θi)vˆ
′(x, i) = vˆ′(x − di, i) gives di = θi1+θix ∈ (0, x). Then by
Theorem 4.1,
I∗(x, i, l) =
(
ηil − θi
1 + θi
)+
x.
Therefore, the HJB equation (8) reads as
ri
δ
+
γi
δ
+
λi
δ
Λˆi − 1 = δAˆi −
∑
j∈S
qijAˆj,
where γi :=
1
2
(µi−ri)2
σ2i
and
Λˆi := E
[
ln
(
1− ηil +
(
ηil − θi
1 + θi
)+)]
− (1 + θi)E
[(
ηil − θi
1 + θi
)+]
.
Let
~ˆ
A = (Aˆ1, Aˆ2, · · · , AˆS)′, ~r = (r1, r2, · · · , rS)′, ~γ = (γ1, γ2, · · · , γS)′,
~
λΛˆ = (λ1Λˆ1, λ2Λˆ2, · · · , λSΛˆS)′, 1 = (1, 1, · · · , 1)′S×1 and I be the S × S
identity matrix. Then the constant vector
~ˆ
A satisfies the linear system
(δI−Q) ~ˆA = 1
δ
(
~r + ~γ +
~
λΛˆ− δ1
)
. (14)
Proposition 4.1 The function vˆ = vˆ(·, ·), given by
vˆ(x, i) =
{
1
δ
ln(δx) + Aˆi, x > 0
−∞, x = 0
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where
~ˆ
A = (Aˆ1, Aˆ2, · · · , AˆS)′ solves the linear system (14), is the value func-
tion of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
u∗(t) = (pi∗(t), c∗(t), I∗(t)) =
(
µ(t) − r(t)
σ2(t)
, δX∗t ,
(
η(t) lt −
θ(t)
1 + θ(t)
)+
X∗t
)
is optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Proof. The function vˆ(·, i) defined above is a smooth function which is
strictly increasing and concave such that vˆ(0, i) = −∞, for every i ∈ S. By
the construction of the vector
~ˆ
A, vˆ satisfies the HJB equation (8).
To show that the candidate policy is admissible, we consider an upper
bound process Z of X∗
dZt
Zt
=
(
r(t) − δ + 2γ(t)
)
dt+
µ(t) − r(t)
σ(t)
dW (t),
with initial value Z(0) = x.
Solving the above SDE gives
Zt = x exp
{∫ t
0
(
r(s) − δ + γ(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
µ(s) − r(s)
σ(s)
dW (s)
}
.
By the definition of Z, we have X∗t ≤ Zt, ∀t ≥ 0. Notice that if (t) = i for
t ∈ (t1, t2], then∫ t2
t1
µ(s) − r(s)
σ(s)
dW (s) =
µi − ri
σi
(W (t2)−W (t1)).
So
∫ t
0
µ(s)−r(s)
σ(s)
dW (s) is a linear combination of independent Brownian mo-
tions. By the exponential martingale property of a Brownian motion, we
have
E
[
exp
(∫ t
0
µ(s) − r(s)
σ(s)
dW (s)
)]
= exp
(∫ t
0
γ(s)ds
)
.
For the candidate of optimal investment proportion pi∗,
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
σ2(t)(pi
∗(s))2ds
]
≤ 2 γM t <∞, ∀t ≥ 0,
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where γM = max
i∈S
{γi}.
Since c∗(t) = 0,∀ t > Θ, for the candidate of optimal consumption c∗,
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c∗(s)ds
]
= Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c∗(s)1s≤Θds
]
≤ δEx,i
[∫ t
0
X∗sds
]
≤ δEx,i
[∫ t
0
Zsds
]
≤ δx
∫ t
0
eK1sds =
δx
K1
(
eK1 t − 1) <∞, ∀t ≥ 0,
where K1 = max
i∈S
{ri − δ + 2γi}.
For the candidate of optimal insurance I∗, ∀Ft-measurable random vari-
able Y , 0 ≤ I∗t (Y ) =
(
Y − θ(t)
1+θ(t)
X∗t
)+
≤ Y , so I∗t ∈ It.
Furthermore, we have
Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δs ln+(c∗s)ds
]
≤ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs| ln(δZs)|ds
]
≤ 1
δ
| ln(δx)|+K ′1
∫ ∞
0
e−δssds
+ 2
√
γM
pi
∫ ∞
0
e−δs
√
s ds
=
1
δ
| ln(δx)|+ K
′
1
δ2
+
√
γM
δ
√
δ
<∞,
where K ′1 = max
i∈S
|ri − δ + γi|.
Therefore, u∗ = (pi∗, c∗, I∗) is optimal policy of Problem 2.1, and by
Theorem 3.2, vˆ is the corresponding value function. 
Example 4.1 S = 2
In this example, we assume there are two regimes in the economy, where
regime 1 represents a bull market and regime 2 represents a bear market. Ac-
cording to French et al. (1987), the stock returns are higher in a bull market,
so µ1 > µ2. Hamilton and Lin (1996) found stock volatility is higher in a
bear market, thus σ1 < σ2. The data of overnight financing rate and trea-
sury bill rate (see, for instance, the statistical data from Bank of Canada)
suggests the risk-free interest rate is higher in good economy, hence r1 > r2.
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Haley (1993) found the underwriting margin is negatively correlated with the
interest rate, which implies the loading factor is smaller in a bull market,
θ1 < θ2. Norden and Weber (2007) observed that CDS spreads (default risk)
are negatively correlated with the stock prices. Equivalently, the default risk
is higher in a bear market, that is, η1 < η2.
The generator matrix entries become
q11 = −Π1, q12 = Π1, q21 = Π2, q22 = −Π2,
with Π1,Π2 > 0, so the linear system (14) becomes
(δ + Π1)Aˆ1 − Π1Aˆ2 = 1
δ
(r1 + γ1 − δ + λ1Λˆ1)
−Π2Aˆ1 + (δ + Π2)Aˆ2 = 1
δ
(r2 + γ2 − δ + λ2Λˆ2)
which gives a unique solution
Aˆi =
Πi(rj + γj − δ + λjΛˆj) + (δ + Πj)(ri + γi − δ + λiΛˆi)
δ2(δ + Π1 + Π2)
,
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
From the above expression of Aˆi, we notice that only Λˆi is not directly
given by the market. To calculate Λˆi, we assume the loss proportion lt does
not depend on time t and we discuss the cases that l is constant or uniformly
distributed on (0, 1). We further assume θ1
η1(1+θ1)
≤ θ2
η2(1+θ2)
. If the opposite
is true, then we switch the expressions when calculating Λˆ1 and Λˆ2.
1. l is constant.
If
(
ηil − θi1+θi
)+
≡ 0, then
Λˆi = ln(1− ηil).
Otherwise, we obtain
Λˆi = − ln(1 + θi)− ηil(1 + θi) + θi.
2. l is uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
If
(
ηil − θi1+θi
)+
≡ 0, then
Λˆi = E [ln(1− ηil)] =
(
1− 1
ηi
)
ln(1− ηi)− 1.
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Otherwise, through straightforward calculus, we obtain
E
[
ln
(
1− ηil +
(
ηil − θi
1 + θi
)+)]
=
(
1
ηi
− 1
)
ln(1 + θi)− θi
ηi(1 + θi)
,
E
[(
ηil − θi
1 + θi
)+]
=
ηi
2
+
θ2i
2ηi(1 + θi)2
− θi
1 + θi
.
Hence,
Λˆi =
(
1
ηi
− 1
)
ln(1 + θi)− (ηi(1 + θi)− θi)
2 + 2θi
2ηi(1 + θi)
.
4.2. U(y, i) = −yα, y > 0, α < 0,∀i ∈ S
In this scenario, a solution to the HJB equation (8) is given by
v˜(x, i) = −A˜1−αi xα, (15)
where the constants A˜i > 0, i ∈ S, will be determined below.
From v˜′(x, i) = −αA˜1−αi x−(1−α), v˜′′(x, i) = α(1 − α)A˜1−αi x−(2−α) and
(U ′)−1(y, i) = (−α
y
)
1
1−α , we obtain
pi∗(x, i) =
µi − ri
(1− α)σ2i
and c∗(x, i) =
x
A˜i
> 0.
Solving (1 + θi)v˜
′(x, i) = v˜′(x− di, i) gives di = νix, where νi := 1− (1 +
θi)
− 1
1−α . Then
I∗(x, i, l) = (ηil − νi)+x.
By plugging the candidate policy into the HJB equation (8), we find the
constants A˜i should satisfy the following non-linear system(
δ − αri − α
1− αγi + λi(1− Λ˜i)
)
A˜1−αi − (1− α)A˜−αi =
∑
j∈S
qijA˜
1−α
j , (16)
where Λ˜i := E
[
(1− ηil + (ηil − νi)+)α
]− α(1 + θi)E[(ηil − νi)+].
In order to guarantee the above non-linear system has a unique positive
solution, we need the following technical condition
δ > max
i∈S
{
αri +
α
1− αγi − λi(1− Λ˜i)
}
. (17)
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Lemma 4.2 The non-linear system (16) has a unique positive solution A˜i,
i ∈ S, if the condition (17) holds.
Proof. See Lemma 4.1 in Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009). 
Proposition 4.2 The function v˜ = v˜(·, ·), given by
v˜(x, i) =
{
−A˜1−αi xα, x > 0
−∞, x = 0 ,
where A˜i is the unique solution to the non-linear system (16), is the value
function of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
u∗(t) =
(
µ(t) − r(t)
(1− α)σ2(t)
,
X∗t
A˜(t)
,
(
η(t) lt − ν(t)
)+
X∗t
)
is optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Proof. To verify that the candidate policy is admissible, we consider an
upper bound process Z˜ of X∗ with the dynamics
dZ˜t
Z˜t
=
(
r(t) +
(µ(t) − r(t))2
(1− α)σ2(t)
)
dt+
µ(t) − r(t)
(1− α)σ(t)dWt.
Given Z˜0 = X
∗
0 = x, we can solve the above SDE to obtain
Z˜t = x exp
{∫ t
0
(
r(s) +
(1− 2α)(µ(s) − r(s))2
2(1− α)2σ2(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
µ(s) − r(s)
(1− α)σ(s)dWs
}
.
We use this upper bound process Z˜ to verify that the conditions for an
admissible control are satisfied. We have for every t ≥ 0 that
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
σ2(t)(pi
∗
s)
2ds
]
≤ 2γM t
(1− α)2 <∞,
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c∗sds
]
≤ 1
A˜m
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
Z˜sds
]
≤ x
A˜m
∫ t
0
eK2sds <∞,
Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δtU+(c∗t )dt
]
≤ Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δt
(
−( Z˜t
A˜(t)
)α
)+
dt
]
= 0,
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where A˜m := min
i∈S
{A˜i} and K2 = max
i∈S
{
ri +
2γi
1−α
}
.
Besides, we can verify that I∗t ∈ It since 0 ≤ I∗t (Y ) = (Y − d(t))+ ≤ Y ,
for every Ft-measurable random variable Y .
Therefore, u∗ defined above is admissible and then is optimal policy of
Problem 2.1. By definition, smooth function v˜(·, i) is strictly increasing and
concave, and satisfies v˜(0, i) = −∞, ∀i ∈ S. From the construction of A˜i,
the HJB equation (8) holds for all i ∈ S. Therefore, according to Theorem
3.2, v˜ is the value function of Problem 2.1. 
Example 4.2 S = 2
To solve the non-linear system (16), we need to find Λ˜i first. In this example,
we show how to find Λ˜i when l is constant or is uniformly distributed on
(0, 1). Without loss of generality, we assume ν1
η1
≤ ν2
η2
. If the opposite holds,
we switch the formulas for Λ˜1 and Λ˜2. The results will be used for economic
analysis in the next section.
1. l is constant.
If (ηil − νi)+ ≡ 0, then
Λ˜i = (1− ηil)α.
Otherwise, we obtain
Λ˜i = (1− νi)α − α(1 + θi)(ηil − νi).
2. l is uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
If (ηil − νi)+ ≡ 0, then
Λ˜i = E [(1− ηil)α] =
{
− 1
ηi
ln(1− ηi), α = −1
1
ηi(1+α)
(1− (1− ηi)1+α), α 6= −1
.
Otherwise, we obtain
E[(ηil − νi)+] =
∫ 1
νi
ηi
(ηil − νi)dl = (ηi − νi)
2
2ηi
,
and when α = −1,
E[(1− ηil + (ηil − νi)+)α] = (1− νi)−1
(
1− νi
ηi
)
− 1
ηi
ln(1− νi),
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and when α 6= −1,
E[(1−ηil+(ηil−νi)+)α] = (1−νi)α
(
1− νi
ηi
− 1− νi
ηi(1 + α)
)
+
1
ηi(1 + α)
.
Therefore, if (ηil − νi)+ 6≡ 0, and α = −1, then
Λ˜i = (1− νi)−1
(
1− νi
ηi
)
− 1
ηi
ln(1− νi) + (1 + θi)(ηi − νi)
2
2ηi
;
and if (ηil − νi)+ 6≡ 0, and α 6= −1, then
Λ˜i = (1− νi)α
(
1− νi
ηi
− 1− νi
ηi(1 + α)
)
+
1
ηi(1 + α)
− α(1 + θi)(ηi − νi)
2
2ηi
.
4.3. U(y, i) = yα, y > 0, 0 < α < 1,∀ i ∈ S
In this case, a solution to the HJB equation (7) has the form
v¯(x, i) = A¯1−αi x
α, (18)
where the constants A¯i > 0, i ∈ S, will be determined below.
Then we can find the candidate for pi∗ and c∗ as
pi∗(x, i) =
µi − ri
(1− α)σ2i
and c∗(x, i) =
x
A¯i
.
From (1 + θi)v¯
′(x, i) = v¯′(x− di, i), we can solve to obtain di = νix with
νi := 1− (1 + θi)− 11−α . By Theorem 4.1, we have
I∗(x, i) = (ηil − νi)+x.
Plugging the candidate policy into the HJB equation (7) yields(
δ − αri − α
1− αγi + λi(1− Λ¯i)
)
A¯1−αi − (1− α)A¯−αi =
∑
j∈S
qijA¯
1−α
j , (19)
where Λ¯i := E
[
(1− ηil + (ηil − νi)+)α
]− α(1 + θi)E[(ηil − νi)+].
We need to impose an extra requirement for δ
δ > max
i∈S
{
αri +
α
1− αγi
}
. (20)
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Lemma 4.3 The non-linear system (19) has a unique positive solution A¯i,
i ∈ S, if the condition (20) is satisfied.
Proof. See Lemma 4.2 in Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009). 
Proposition 4.3 The function v¯(x, i) = A¯1−αi x
α, x ≥ 0, where A¯i is the
unique solution to the non-linear system (19), is the value function of Prob-
lem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
u∗(t) :=
(
µ(t) − r(t)
(1− α)σ2(t)
,
X∗t
A¯(t)
, (η(t) lt − ν(t))+X∗t
)
is optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Proof. We use the same upper bound process Z˜ defined in Section 4.2. By
following a similar argument as in the previous proposition, we can easily
verify Ex,i
[∫ t
0
σ2(t)(pi
∗
s)
2ds
]
<∞, Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c∗sds
]
<∞ and I∗t ∈ It, ∀t ≥ 0.
Besides, we have
Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δtU+(c∗t )dt
]
≤ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
Z˜t
A¯(t)
)α
dt
]
=
xα
A¯αm
∫ ∞
0
e−δt exp
(∫ t
0
(
αr(s) +
α
1− αγ(s)
)
ds
)
dt
≤ x
α
K3A¯αm
<∞,
where A¯m = min
i∈S
A¯i and K3 = min
i∈S
(δ − αri − α1−αγi) > 0 (K3 > 0 is because
of the condition (20)).
By definition, v¯(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞) is strictly increasing and concave, and
satisfies v¯(0, i) = U(0,i)
δ
= 0 for all i ∈ S. By the construction of constants
A¯i, the HJB equation (8) holds for all i ∈ S.
Therefore, u∗ is admissible and then is optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Furthermore, by Theorem 3.1, v¯ defined above is the value function of Prob-
lem 2.1. 
Example 4.3 S = 2
We notice that the non-linear systems (16) and (19) are identical expect
that α is negative in (16) while in (19), α ∈ (0, 1). Hence in a two-regime
economy, we shall obtain Λ¯i in the same form of Λ˜i as in Example 4.2.
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4.4. U(y, i) = βiy
1/2, y > 0, βi > 0, i = 1, 2
In this case, a solution to the HJB equation (7) is given by
vˇ(x, i) = (Aˇix)
1/2, (21)
where the constants Aˇi > 0, i = 1, 2, will be determined below.
From vˇ′(x, i) = 1
2
Aˇ
1
2
i x
− 1
2 , vˇ′′(x, i) = −1
4
Aˇ
1
2
i x
− 3
2 and (U ′)−1(y, i) = ( βi
2y
)2,
we obtain the candidate for pi∗ and c∗
pi∗(x, i) =
2(µi − ri)
σ2i
and c∗(x, i) =
β2i x
Aˇi
.
Solving (1+θi)vˇ
′(x, i) = vˇ′(x−di, i) gives di = νˇix where νˇi := 1− 1(1+θi)2 .
Thus a candidate for optimal insurance is
I∗(x, i) = (ηil − νˇi)+x.
From the HJB equation (7), we obtain the following nonlinear system(
δ − 1
2
ri − γi + λi(1− Λˇi)
)
Aˇ
1/2
i −
1
2
β2i
Aˇ
1/2
i
=
∑
j∈S
qijAˇ
1/2
j ,
where Λˇi := E
[
(1− ηil + (ηil − νˇi)+)1/2
]− 1
2
(1 + θi)E [(ηil − νˇi)+].
Since S = 2, so we have q11 = −Π1, q12 = Π1, q21 = Π2, q22 = −Π2 with
Π1,Π2 > 0. Thus we can rewrite the above system as
ξˇiAˇi − β
2
i
2Πi
= (Aˇ1Aˇ2)
1/2, (22)
where ξˇi :=
1
Πi
[
δ + Πi − 12ri − γi + λi(1− Λˇi)
]
.
Lemma 4.4 The non-linear system (22) has a real solution Aˇi ≥ β
2
i
2Πiξˇi
> 0,
i = 1, 2, if δ > max
i=1,2
{
1
2
ri + γi,
1
2
ri + γi − λi(1− Λˇi)
}
.
Proof. The non-linear system (22) is equivalent to
ξˇ1Aˇ1 − β
2
1
2Π1
=
√
Aˇ1Aˇ2 = ξˇ2Aˇ2 − β
2
2
2Π2
.
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Solving this system for Aˇ1 gives(
ξˇ1
ξˇ2
− ξˇ21
)
Aˇ21 −
(
β21
2Π1ξˇ2
− β
2
2
2Π2ξˇ2
− ξˇ1β
2
1
Π1
)
Aˇ1 − β
4
1
4Π21
= 0.
The discriminant of the above quadratic equation is
∆ =
(
β21
2Π1ξˇ2
− β
2
2
2Π2ξˇ2
)2
+
ξˇ1β
2
1β
2
2
Π1Π2ξˇ2
.
Since δ > 1
2
ri + γi − λi(1 − Λˇi), we have ξˇi > 1, i = 1, 2 and then
∆ > 0, which implies Aˇ1 has a real solution. Besides,
√
Aˇ1Aˇ2 ≥ 0, so
Aˇ1 ≥ β
2
1
2Π1ξˇ1
> 0. Similar analysis also applies to Aˇ2. 
Proposition 4.4 The function vˇ defined by vˇ(x, i) = (Aˇix)
1/2, x > 0, where
Aˇi is the positive solution to the non-linear system (22), is the value function
of Problem 2.1. Furthermore, the policy given by
u∗(t) :=
(
2(µ(t) − r(t))
σ2(t)
,
β2(t)X
∗
t
Aˇ(t)
, (η(t) lt − νˇ(t))+X∗t
)
is optimal policy of Problem 2.1.
Proof. We consider an upper bound process Zˇ of X∗ to verify that the
candidate policy is admissible. The dynamics of Zˇ is given by
dZˇt
Zˇt
=
(
r(t) +
2(µ(t) − r(t))2
σ2(t)
)
dt+
2(µ(t) − r(t))
σ(t)
dW (t),
with initial condition Zˇ0 = X
∗
0 = x.
The solution to the above SDE is
Zˇt = x · exp
{∫ t
0
r(s)ds+ 2
∫ t
0
µ(s) − r(s)
σ(s)
dW (s)
}
.
Since X∗t ≤ Zˇt, ∀ t ≥ 0, we have
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
c∗(s)ds
]
≤ β
2
M
Aˇm
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
Zˇsds
]
=
β2Mx
Aˇm
∫ t
0
exp
(∫ s
0
(r(v) + 4γ(v))dv
)
ds
≤ β
2
Mx
Aˇm
∫ t
0
eK4s =
β2Mx
K4Aˇm
(eK4t − 1) <∞,
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where βM = max{β1, β2}, Aˇm = min{Aˇ1, Aˇ2} and K4 = max
i=1,2
{ri + 4γi}.
Furthermore, we calculate
Ex,i
[∫ Θ
0
e−δsU+(c∗s, s)ds
]
≤ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsβ(s)
β(s)(X
∗
s )
1/2
Aˇ
1/2
(s)
ds
]
≤ Ex,i
[∫ ∞
0
e−δsβ(s)
β(s)Zˇ
1/2
s
Aˇ
1/2
(s)
ds
]
=
β2Mx
1/2
Aˇ
1/2
m
∫ t
0
e−δs exp
(∫ s
0
(
1
2
r(v) + γ(v))dv
)
ds
≤ β
2
Mx
1/2
Aˇ
1/2
m
∫ ∞
0
e−K5sds =
β2Mx
1/2
K5Aˇ
1/2
m
<∞,
where K5 := mini∈S(δ− 12ri− γi) > 0 (Notice K5 > 0 due to the assumption
that δ > 1
2
ri + γi, ∀ i ∈ S).
Besides, ∀ t ≥ 0,
Ex,i
[∫ t
0
σ2(s)(pi
∗
s)
2ds
]
≤ 8γM t < +∞,
and 0 ≤ I∗t (Y ) = (Y − νˇ(t)X∗t )+ ≤ Y , for every Ft-measurable random
variable Y .
We have proved u∗ is admissible and thus u∗ is optimal policy of Problem
2.1. By definition, vˇ(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞) is strictly increasing and concave, and
satisfies vˇ(0, i) = U(0,i)
δ
, i = 1, 2. By the construction of Aˇi, the HJB equation
(7) is satisfied for i = 1, 2. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, the value function is
given by vˇ(x, i) + 1
δ
Ex,i[
∫∞
0
e−δsdU(0, s)] = vˇ(x, i) because dU(0, s) = 0. 
5. Economic Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of market parameters and the
investor’s risk aversion on optimal policy, and how insurance affects the ex-
pected total discounted utility of consumption (the value function). To con-
duct the economic analysis, we assume there are two regimes in the economy,
like in Example 4.1, Example 4.2, and Example 4.3: regime 1 represents a
bull market while regime 2 represents a bear market. We only consider the
first three utility functions in the economic analysis.
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5.1. Impact of market parameters and risk aversion on optimal policy
According to the results obtained in Section 4, we write the optimal
proportion invested in the stock in an uniform expression
pi∗t =
1
1− α
µ(t) − r(t)
σ2(t)
, (23)
where α = 0 when U(y, i) = ln(y).
During any given regime, the optimal investment proportion in the stock
pi∗ is constant, and only depends on market parameters (expected excess
return over variance) and the investor’s risk aversion parameter α.
The dependency of pi∗ on market parameters is evident. Through empir-
ical research, French et al. (1987) find that the expected excess return over
variance is higher in good economy. Therefore, in a bull market, investors
should invest a greater proportion of their wealth on the stock.
Expression (23) shows that pi∗ is inversely proportional to the relative
risk aversion 1−α, so low risk-averse investors (with greater α) will invest a
higher proportion of their wealth on the stock.
For all three cases, the optimal consumption rate process is proportional
to the wealth process and such ratio κ(t) := c
∗(t)
X∗(t) is given by
κ(t) =

δ, if U(y, i) = ln(y), α = 0;
1
A˜(t)
, if U(y, i) = −yα, α < 0;
1
A¯(t)
, if U(y, i) = yα, 0 < α < 1.
Since κ(t) is positive in all three cases, investors will consume proportionally
more when they become wealthier. To examine the dependency of the opti-
mal consumption to wealth ratio κ(t) on α, we separate our discussion into
the following three cases.
For moderate risk-averse investors (α = 0), κ(t) is constant regardless
of the market regimes, so moderate risk-averse investors consume the same
proportion of their wealth in both bull and bear markets.
For high risk-averse investors (α < 0), their optimal consumption to
wealth ratio is given by 1/A˜i, i = 1, 2, where A˜ can be obtained from the
system (16). To find a numerical solution to the system (16), we set market
parameters as µ1 = 0.2, µ2 = 0.15, r1 = 0.08, r2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.25, σ2 =
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0.6, θ1 = 0.15, θ2 = 0.25, η1 = 0.8, η2 = 1, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2,Π1 = 6.04,Π2 =
6.4, and δ = 0.15 (for the convenience of citation thereafter, we denote the
choice of market parameters here as Parameter Set I). Notice that these
parameters satisfy the technical condition (17). We draw graphs in Figure 1
for the optimal consumption to wealth ratio when −1 < α < 0 and l = 0.3,
l = 0.5, and l = 0.7. We see that the optimal consumption to wealth ratio is
an increasing function of α. Thus, the higher the risk tolerance, the higher the
proportion of consumption over wealth. For the above parameter values, we
find 1/A˜1 > 1/A˜2, which can be seen from Figure 1. Hence investors should
Figure 1: Optimal consumption to wealth ratio when α < 0
allocate a higher proportion of their wealth to consumption in a bull market.
For any chosen investor (fixed α), she/he will behave more conservatively
by reducing the proportion spent in consumption when facing larger losses
(greater l). This behavior was not noticed in Sotomayor and Cadenillas
(2009), because they did not incorporate an insurable loss in their model.
Besides, from a mathematical point of view, the ratios all converge to 0.15
when α approaches 0, which is exactly the same optimal consumption to
wealth ratio when α = 0 (δ = 0.15).
For low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1), the optimal consumption to
wealth ratio is given by 1/A¯i, i = 1, 2, where 1/A¯i can be calculated from
the system (19). We set market parameters to be µ1 = 0.2, µ2 = 0.15, r1 =
0.15, r2 = 0.1, σ1 = 0.4, σ2 = 0.6, θ1 = 0.15, θ2 = 0.25, η1 = 0.8, η2 = 1, λ1 =
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0.1, λ2 = 0.2,Π1 = 6.04,Π2 = 6.4, and δ = 0.2 (denoted as Parameter Set
II). For these parameters values, the corresponding technical condition (20) is
satisfied. Figure 2 shows that the optimal consumption to wealth ratio when
Figure 2: Consumption to wealth ratio when 0 < α < 1
l = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. Similar to the previous case, we also observe that the
optimal consumption to wealth ratio is an increasing function of α. However,
contrary to the previous case, we have 1/A¯1 < 1/A¯2 when 0 < α < 1. This
means low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1) spend a smaller proportion of
their wealth on consumption in a bull market. We notice that for very low
risk-averse investors (α close to 1), the optimal consumption to wealth ratio
is even greater than 1, meaning they finance consumption by borrowing.
By comparing all three cases, we conclude that investors with high risk
tolerance (α is large) consume at large proportion of their wealth in every
market regime. However, investors’ consumption decision depends on the
market regimes, and investors with different risk aversion attitudes behave
differently in bull and bear markets.
The optimal insurance for all three utility functions is deductible insur-
ance, and is given by
I∗t =
[
η(t) l − 1 + (1 + θ(t))− 11−α
]+
X∗t .
We observe that, for each fixed regime, the optimal insurance is proportional
to the investor’s wealth X∗. We note that it is optimal to buy insurance if
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and only if η(t) l − 1 + (1 + θ(t))− 11−α > 0, or equivalently if and only if
η(t)l > 1− (1 + θ(t))− 11−α . (24)
Thus, it is optimal to buy insurance if and only if, relative to the other vari-
ables, η(t) is large, l is large, θ(t) is small, and α is small (we recall that
α ∈ (−∞, 1)). That is, it is optimal to buy insurance if the insurable loss
is large, the cost of insurance is low, and the investor is very risk averse. It
is surprising that the variable λ(t) does not appear explicitly in this expres-
sion. Our explanation is that λ(t) is implicitly incorporated in X
∗
t , so λ(t) is
important as well to determine the optimal insurance.
If it is optimal to buy insurance, or equivalently, the condition (24) is
satisfied, then I∗t =
[
η(t) l − 1 + (1 + θ(t))− 11−α
]
X∗t . Thus, as expected, the
optimal insurance is proportional to η(t) and l. Furthermore,
∂I∗t
∂θ(t)
= −
[
1
1− α(1 + θ(t))
− 2−α
1−α
]
X∗t < 0,
∂2I∗t
∂θ2(t)
=
[
2− α
(1− α)2 (1 + θ(t))
2α−3
1−α
]
X∗t > 0.
Hence, the optimal insurance is a decreasing and convex function of θ. The
decreasing property means that, as the premium loading θ increases, it is
optimal to reduce the purchase of insurance. The convexity indicates the
amount of reduction in insurance decreases as the premium loading rises.
In addition, if it is optimal to buy insurance (when condition (24) is
satisfied), then
∂I∗t
∂α
= −
[
1
(1− α)2 ln(1 + θ(t))(1 + θ(t))
− 1
1−α
]
X∗t < 0,
∂2I∗t
∂α2
=
[
ln(1 + θ(t))
(1− α)3
(
ln(1 + θ(t))
1− α − 2
)
(1 + θ(t))
− 1
1−α
]
X∗t .
Hence, the optimal insurance is a decreasing function of α, which implies
the higher the risk tolerance, the smaller amount spent on insurance. We
observe
∂2I∗t
∂α2
and
ln(1+θ(t))
1−α − 2 have the same sign. Recall that θ is the
premium loading, which usually does not exceed 100%. So when α ≤ 0, we
have
∂2I∗t
∂α2
< 0. This indicates that for high and moderate risk-averse investors
(α ≤ 0), the reduction in insurance is more significant when α is greater. If
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0 < α < 1, we find that
∂2I∗t
∂α2
< 0 when α < α˜ and
∂2I∗t
∂α2
> 0 when α > α˜,
where α˜ := 1− 1
2
ln(1+θ(t)). So for low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1), the
magnitude of reduction in insurance depends on the risk aversion attitude.
5.2. Impact of insurance on value function
In this subsection, we want to calculate the advantage of buying insurance
for investors when facing a random insurable risk. To achieve this objective,
we first assume some investors cannot access the insurance market. We then
calculate the value function with the constraint of no insurance, denoted by
V1(x, i), and compare V1(x, i) with V (x, i) (the value function of the uncon-
strained Problem 2.1).
Under the constraint of no insurance, the dynamics of the wealth process
X1 is given by
dX1(t) =
(
r(t)X1(t) + (µ(t) − r(t))pi(t)X1(t)− c(t)
)
dt
+ σ(t)pi(t)X1(t)dW (t)− LtdN(t), X1(0) = x.
Here the insurable loss L(t) = η(t) l(t)X1(t).
We then formulate the constrained problem as follows.
Problem 5.1 Select an admissible policy u∗1 := (pi
∗
1, c
∗
1) that maximizes the
criterion function J , defined by (2). In addition, find the value function
V1(x, i) := sup
u1∈A1
J(x, i;u1).
For every u1 = (pi1, c1) ∈ A1, pi1 and c1 need to satisfy all the conditions that
pi and c satisfy, where (pi, c, I) ∈ Ax,i. Since for any u1 = (pi1, c1) ∈ A1, we
have (pi1, c1, I ≡ 0) ∈ Ax,i. Therefore, V (x, i) ≥ V1(x, i) for all x > 0 and
i ∈ S.
We provide a verification theorem to Problem 5.1 when the utility func-
tion does not depend on the regime (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for proofs),
that is, U(y, i) = U(y) for every i ∈ S.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose U(0) = 0 or U(0) = −∞. Let v(·, i) ∈ C2(0,∞) be
an increasing and concave function such that v(0, i) = U(0)
δ
for every i ∈ S.
If v = v(·, ·) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
sup
(pi1,c1)
{Gpi1,c1i v(x, i) + U(c1) + λiE[v(x− L, i)]} = −∑
j∈S
qijv(x, j), (25)
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where the operator G is defined as
Gpi1,c1i (ψ) := (rix+ (µi − ri)pix− c1)ψ′ +
1
2
σ2i pi
2x2ψ′′ − (δ + λi)ψ,
and the control u∗1 := (pi
∗
1, c
∗
1) defined by
u∗1(t) :=
(
1
1− α
(µ(t) − r(t))
σ2(t)
, (U ′)−1(v′ (X∗1 (t), (t)))
)
is admissible, then u∗1 is optimal control to Problem 5.1.
5.2.1. U(y) = ln(y), y > 0
Under the logarithmic utility, we find the value function to Problem 5.1
is given by
vˆ1(x, i) =
1
δ
ln(δx) + aˆi,
where the constants aˆi satisfy the following linear system
ri
δ
+
γi
δ
+
λi
δ
Υˆi − 1 = δaˆi −
∑
j∈S
qij aˆj, (26)
with Υˆi defined by Υˆi := E[ln(1− ηil)].
To compare the value functions vˆ and vˆ1, we assume there are two regimes
(S = 2) in the economy. Under this assumption, we find aˆi given by
aˆi =
Πi(rj + γj − δ + λjΥˆj) + (δ + Πj)(ri + γi − δ + λiΥˆi)
δ2(δ + Π1 + Π2)
,
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
We then calculate
vˆ(x, i)− vˆ1(x, i) = Πiλj(Λˆj − Υˆj) + λi(δ + Πj)(Λˆi − Υˆi)
δ2(δ + Π1 + Π2)
, (27)
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
To facilitate our scenario analysis, we assume θ1
η1(1+θ1)
≤ θ2
η2(1+θ2)
and l is
either constant or uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
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• Case 1: l is constant.
In this case, Υˆi = ln(1− ηil), i = 1, 2.
(i) Optimal insurance is no insurance for both regimes.
From Example 4.1, we notice when the optimal insurance I∗ is no
insurance, we have Λˆi = ln(1−ηil), i = 1, 2. Then, we obtain Λˆi−Υˆi =
0 for both regimes. Hence vˆ(x, i) = vˆ1(x, i) for all x > 0 and i = 1, 2.
(ii) Optimal insurance is strictly positive in at least one regime.
When the optimal insurance I∗ is strictly positive in at least one regime,
we must have at least one Λˆi in the form of Λˆi = − ln(1 + θi)− ηil(1 +
θi) + θi. Without loss of generality, we assume I
∗ > 0 in regime 1, or
equivalently, η1l − θ11+θ1 > 0. Then we obtain
Λˆ1 − Υˆ1 = − ln(1 + θ1)− η1l(1 + θ1) + θ1 − ln(1− η1l)
> −η1l(1 + θ1)− ln(1− η1l),
where the second inequality comes from − ln(1+θ1)+θ1 > 0. Consider
w(l) := −η1l(1 + θ1)− ln(1− η1l). We have w(0) = 0 and
w′(l) =
η1
(1− η1l)(1 + θ1)
(
η1l − θ1
1 + θ1
)
> 0.
This implies w(l) > 0 for all l ∈ (0, 1), and then Λˆ1− Υˆ1 > 0. Together
with the result above, we can claim that Λˆ2−Υˆ2 ≥ 0. Hence, regardless
of the optimal insurance I∗ in regime 2, we have vˆ(x, i) > vˆ1(x, i) for
both regimes according to (27). Even when I∗(x, i = 2, l) = 0, buying
insurance in regime 1 increases the value function in regime 2, which is
a surprising result.
To further study the advantage of buying insurance, we define the in-
crease ratio of the value function by
m(x, i) :=
∣∣∣∣V (x, i)− V1(x, i)V1(x, i)
∣∣∣∣ , i = 1, 2,
where V (x, i) and V1(x, i) are the value functions to Problem 2.1 and
Problem 5.1, respectively.
34
Without loss of generality, we assume x = 1
δ
(such assumption makes
the constant 1
δ
ln(δx) be 0). Hence, we have V (x, i) = vˆ(x, i) = Aˆi and
V1(x, i) = vˆ1(x, i) = aˆi, i = 1, 2. Then we obtain for i = 1, 2
m(x, i) =
Πiλj(Λˆj − Υˆj) + λi(δ + Πj)(Λˆi − Υˆi)
|Πi(rj + γj − δ + λjΥˆj) + (δ + Πj)(ri + γi − δ + λiΥˆi)|
.
To analyze the impact of the insurable loss on the ratio m, we keep l
as a variable and choose Parameter Set I but δ = 0.2. Notice that for
the chosen parameters, our assumption is satisfied
θ1
η1(1 + θ1)
= 0.16 <
θ2
η2(1 + θ2)
= 0.2.
Since we assume I∗ > 0 in regime 1, l ∈ (0.16, 1). We draw the graph
of the increase ratio of the value function in Figure 3. As expected,
Figure 3: Increase ratio of the value function when loss proportion is constant
the advantage of buying insurance increases when the insurable loss
becomes larger in both regimes. But surprisingly, we find that buying
insurance benefits investors more in a bull market, especially when the
insurable loss is large.
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• Case 2. l is uniformly distributed on (0, 1).
In this case, Υˆi =
∫ 1
0
ln(1− ηil)dl = (1− 1ηi ) ln(1− ηi)− 1, i = 1, 2.
(i) Optimal insurance is no insurance for both regimes.
In this scenario, it is obvious that Λˆi = Υˆi and then vˆ(x, i) = vˆ1(x, i),
for all x > 0 and i = 1, 2.
(ii) Optimal insurance is strictly positive in at least one regime.
Again we assume I∗ > 0 in regime 1. Then we have
Λˆ1 − Υˆ1 = ( 1
η1
− 1) ln((1 + θ1)(1− η1)) + 1− (η1(1 + θ1)− θ1)
2 + 2θ1
2η1(1 + θ1)
.
Here Λˆ1− Υˆ1 depends on the premium loading θ and loss intensity η in
regime 1. To investigate such dependency, we conduct a numerical cal-
culation. Notice that η1 must satisfy the condition η1 ≥ θ11+θ1 . We draw
the difference Λˆ1− Υˆ1 in Figure 4 when θ1 = 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, 0.99.
We observe that Λˆ1 − Υˆ1 is strictly positive and therefore vˆ(x, i) >
Figure 4: Λˆi − Υˆi
vˆ1(x, i) for both regimes, which is consistent with our findings in the
previous case. Furthermore, as θ increases (which means the cost of
insurance policy increases), the difference of Λˆi − Υˆi becomes smaller,
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so the benefit of purchasing insurance policy decreases accordingly. In-
vestors gain more advantage from insurance when the insurable loss
becomes larger (that is, the loss intensity η increases).
5.2.2. U(y) = −yα, α < 0
The value function to Problem 5.1 is given by
v˜1(x, i) = −a˜1−αi xα,
where positive constants a˜i satisfy(
δ − αri − α
1− αγi + λi(1− Υ˜i)
)
a˜1−αi − (1− α)a˜−αi =
∑
j∈S
qij a˜
1−α
j , (28)
with Υ˜i := E
[
(1− ηil)α
]
.
Comparing with the value function we found in Section 4.2, we have
v˜(x, i)− v˜1(x, i) = −(A˜1−αi − a˜1−αi )x.
We assume there are two regimes in the economy and the loss proportion
l is constant. We skip the trivial case of I∗ ≡ 0, in which v˜(x, i) = v˜1(x, i)
in both regimes. We then carry out a numerical calculation to study the
non-trivial case, that is I∗(x, i, l) > 0 in at least one regime.
To solve the systems (16) and (28) numerically, we choose Parameter Set I
but δ = 0.25. For the chosen parameters, it is more reasonable to consider the
case when l ∈ (ν2
η2
, 1) (Since both ν1
η1
and ν2
η2
are small). In Table 1 we calculate
v˜(x, i) − v˜1(x, i) for various values of α (when calculating v˜(x, i) − v˜1(x, i),
we take x = 1). The result clearly confirms that v˜(x, i) > v˜1(x, i) in both
regimes. We also observe that the advantage of buying insurance is greater for
investors with higher risk aversion. The size of the insurable loss l affects the
advantage of buying insurance as well. When the insurable loss increases (loss
proportion l increases), buying insurance will give investors more advantage.
We obtain v˜(1, 1)− v˜1(1, 1) > v˜(1, 2)− v˜1(1, 2), meaning buying insurance is
more advantageous in a bull market.
5.2.3. U(y) = yα, 0 < α < 1
We find the corresponding value function to Problem 5.1 given by
v¯1(x, i) = a¯
1−α
i x
α,
where the constants a¯i satisfy the system (28) with 0 < α < 1.
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α l v˜(x, 1)− v˜1(x, 1) v˜(x, 2)− v˜1(x, 2)
l = 0.30 7.7176× 10−5 7.4304× 10−5
-0.01 l = 0.60 9.8981× 10−4 9.5315× 10−4
l = 0.90 0.0041 0.0039
l = 0.15 0.0015 0.0015
-0.5 l = 0.35 0.0797 0.0781
l = 0.50 0.3010 0.2961
l = 0.20 0.1675 0.1653
-1 l = 0.30 0.8116 0.8036
l = 0.40 2.6969 2.6841
l = 0.08 0.2454 0.2441
-2 l = 0.10 0.9421 0.9381
l = 0.12 2.2418 2.2344
Table 1: A˜i − a˜i when loss proportion l ∈ ( ν2η2 , 1)
From the discussion in Section 4.3, we obtain v¯(x, i)− v¯1(x, i) = (A¯1−αi −
a¯1−αi )x
α. We then follow all the assumptions made in Section 5.2.2 including
x = 1 and conduct a numerical analysis by choosing Parameter Set II. In this
numerical example, we have ν1
η1
≤ ν2
η2
< 1 when α ∈ (0, 0.8672], ν2
η2
≤ ν1
η1
< 1,
when α ∈ (0.8672, 0.9132], and ν2
η2
≤ 1 < ν2
η2
when α ∈ (0.9132, 1). We
consider the first scenario: ν1
η1
≤ ν2
η2
< 1 since it includes most low risk-averse
investors. We are interested in the case of I∗ > 0 in at least one regime. For
the chosen parameters, we find ν1
η1
is so small that the case of l ∈ (0, ν1
η1
) is
rare. So we further assume constant loss proportion l ∈ (ν1
η1
, ν2
η2
]. Notice that
when l ∈ (ν1
η1
, ν2
η2
], we have I∗(x, 1, l) > 0 but I∗(x, 2, l) = 0.
From solving the non-linear systems (19) and (28), we draw v¯(x, i) −
v¯1(x, i) for l = lM :=
1
2
(ν1
η1
+ ν2
η2
) and l = lm :=
ν2
η2
− 0.01 in Figure 5.
It is obvious that v¯(1, i) − v¯1(1, i) > 0 in both regimes. As have seen in
the previous cases, the benefit of buying insurance in a bull market strictly
outperforms that in a bear market. We also observe a surprising result that
the difference of the value functions (advantage of buying insurance) is not
an increasing function of α, which is different from the result in Section 5.2.2.
But the difference is a concave function of α.
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Figure 5: v¯(1, i)− v¯1(1, i) when l ∈ ( ν1η1 , ν2η2 ]
6. Conclusions
We have considered simultaneous optimal consumption, investment and
insurance problems in a regime switching model which enables the regime of
the economy to affect not only the financial but also the insurance market. A
risk-averse investor facing an insurable risk wants to obtain the optimal con-
sumption, investment and insurance policy that maximizes her/his expected
total discounted utility of consumption over an infinite time horizon.
We have presented the first versions of verification theorems for simulta-
neous optimal consumption, investment and insurance problems when there
is regime switching. We have also obtained explicitly the optimal policy and
the value function when the utility function belongs to the HARA class.
The optimal proportion of wealth invested in the stock is constant in
every regime, and is greater in a bull market regardless of the investor’s risk
aversion attitude. We observe that investors with high risk tolerance invest
a large proportion of wealth in the stock.
The optimal consumption to wealth ratio is a strictly increasing function
of the investor’s risk aversion parameter (α). Moderate risk-averse investors
(α = 0) consume at a constant proportion in both regimes. High risk-averse
investors (α < 0) consume a higher proportion of their wealth in a bull
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market. In contrast, low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1) consume propor-
tionally more in a bear market.
The optimal insurance is proportional to the investor’s wealth and such
proportion depends on the premium loading θ and the investor’s risk aversion
parameter α. As the loading θ increases, the demand for insurance decreases.
This decrease of the demand for insurance is more significant when θ is small.
We observe that investors who are very risk tolerant (that is, investors with
large α) spend a small amount of wealth in insurance. For high and moderate
risk-averse investors (α ≤ 0), the amount of reduction in insurance is greater
when α is far away from 0. However, low risk-averse investors (0 < α < 1)
reduce the amount of insurance in different magnitudes that depend on the
value of α.
We have also obtained the conditions under which it is optimal to buy
insurance, and analyzed their dependence on the different parameters.
We have calculated the advantage of buying insurance. Based on a com-
parative analysis, we find the value function V (x, i) to Problem 2.1 is strictly
greater than the value function V1(x, i) to Problem 5.1 when the optimal in-
surance is not equal to 0 in all regimes. We also observe that the advantage
of buying insurance is greater in a bull market. Investors who face a large
random loss, gain more benefits from purchasing insurance.
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